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Valuative Intelligence 
The Creative Design of our Wellbeing 
AutorIn: Theodore Scaltsas 
I. Introduction 
When we talk about 'creative thinking' we mean ideas which are new, useful, and they must also 
be a bit surprising. These are ideas which propose solutions or make suggestions of a novel type, 
namely, not only combining ideas that have not been combined before, but where their 
combination is not even similar to previous combinations. This is what makes them surprising, 
over and above being new. For example, the Swiss Knife exemplified a creative idea, which was 
new, because these particular items had not being combined before in one, but which was also a 
new type of combination of functions of that type. It was novel, it was useful, and surprising, as 
there had not even been anything like it before. Creative ideas are found in industry, business, 
media, crafts and arts, in engineering and in science. Nevertheless, are there domains where 
creative thinking does not extend? Are there domains where creative thinking might even be 
inappropriate? I wish to address the question of creative thinking in the domain of emotions and 
social values, to investigate the possibility of the creative design of emotions and/or of social values. 
First, let us address the question of whether we need to be creative in relation to emotions and 
social values. By social values, I mean all types of value we encounter in society, from personal to 
religious, cultural, social, national, gender, racial etc. There has always been change in emotions 
and social values, either motivated by political concerns, or national circumstances, or personal 
developments, etc. For instance, the move from determining value according to supply and 
demand, rather than according to the traditional criterion of exerted labour, was creative, when 
first introduced; so was the notion of a thief suing his victim for violation of the thief's rights 
(Express 2011). Typically, such changes are gradual, but they do eventually spread like waves in 
society. However, this is presently changing. I will argue that creativity in designing new emotions 
and values will become an everyday necessity for all of us, on account of the dramatic rate of 
intrusive technological change taking place in society, grounded on and informed by neurological 
research findings. I claim that we need to learn how to design new emotions and values 
ourselves, in view of the rate of social change we are beginning to experience, because we cannot 
wait for the cycle of academics or politicians introducing new theories/policies of emotion/value, 
to help us cope with the changing possibilities for attaining wellbeing in our daily lives 
II. The need for a Creative Design of Social Values 
To understand the possibility, reality and inevitability of rapid changes of social values, one may 
consider first the changes that have taken place in public values regarding the acceptance of gay 
people, at first, transsexual changes later, same-sex marriage, homosexual clergy, etc. (Dimock 
2013). We have been much aware of such value changes, because of the publicity of their 
struggles. But there are numerous other changes of values happening all the time without our 
realising the changes, because they do not need to enter into legislation. For instance, changes in our 
values of privacy (van den Hoven et.al. 2016). What was guarded as private, in the second half of 
the 20th Century, found its place on Facebook pages in the Millennials, motivated by social media 
companies, peer pressure, and our desire for attention. There were of course also reflective 
changes regarding such values, as the change in our attitude from snitching to whistleblowing; the 
introduction, acceptance, and even praise, of whistleblowing since the 1960's. However, there 
were also unreflective changes of value, as the request to declare and keep updating one's 'Status' 
on Facebook, which encouraged divulging personal information very publicly, information that 
would have formerly been kept private to the individual (Mullins 2016). Peer pressure, 
conformity, keeping up, etc., are all platforms for the exchange of values for social preferables of 
one kind or another. 
Social values can also be hacked. Consider subliminal advertising (Merikle 2017). Its purpose is to 
influence the viewer positively for a product, without the viewer realising the reasons for the 
positive disposition they develop towards this product. The subliminal messages may be benign, 
e.g. a soft colour, but they may also be reprehensible. In either case, the user is developing a 
positive disposition without being aware of the reasons that are engineered to produce it in her. 
The possibilities of value-hacking are increasing as we speak, with the spread of social media and 
the digital methods they continuously innovate to generate new methods of influencing their 
users, or worse, with the way their networks can be used by others for their purposes. Children 
are naturally particularly vulnerable (Knorr 2014). 
Although subliminal advertising and more generally value hacking have made a negative 
impression on us, technology is now generating positive reasons for deferring judgement 
regarding impact to machines – to algorithms. This is not a new trend that might affect our social 
values; it is an avalanche of social-value-change that will hit society in the coming decade and 
beyond. 
One area that will make severe demands on the design of new social values is the new Generation 
of the Internet of Things (IoT) (Pieroni et.al. 2015). Smart 'things' will interact with us, on the 
basis of values that have been programmed in them, or which they have algorithmically deep-
learned or developed, and which will determine their behaviour towards us. Will we leave it to the 
digital technologists to choose what values to code into smart technology that will interact with 
adults, the elderly and children? Whose choice should this be? Should the requisite values for 
smart technology be replicas of our values or different? Are we communicating with persons or 
machines? Who will decide which and what? Digital companies are not waiting to find out. If 
machines are to use our values, where will technologists find these values to copy them into their 
designs or to be guided by them? Will machines need values we do not possess, because of their 
differences from us, and if so, who will design these values? Here is a simple case of the need for 
new values to be designed. 
One domain in which moral and social values are presently being designed is the domain of 
driverless cars. These cars, which are being designed by car and AI companies dedicated to profit 
making, need to appeal to the public, in order to sell. This background principle affects and 
guides the design of values for the way driverless cars will run (Greenmeier 2016). The reason 
why we speak of 'designing values' in relation to driverless cars is that we need to codify good 
road behaviour into rules that can be implemented by the software of the car. These rules must 
be such as to enable the car to respond to any type of situation, combining unusual and odd 
circumstances and, particularly, priorities. For all these, which drivers handle on the basis of their 
developed driving dispositions, which they put to action at a moment of need on the road, the 
driverless car needs codes which will guide its actions. Some may be circumstances that even 
humans do not have rules of thumb to follow, such as the Trolley Example from philosophy, e.g. 
should one swerve left to avoid killing a baby, but risking killing three adults, or vice versa? 
However countless possibilities may arise. Can it be that a driverless car causing death is not 
comparable to a human causing death, but comparable to the Ministry of the Interior causing 
death by not spending more funds on road safety? Can it be that new types of value need to be 
designed for cars; new types of culpability, which are neither human nor institutional? 
A far more imperceptible change of value comes from a casual social media habit we all have. 
They have now developed an algorithm at Stanford, which collects and personalises the 'likes' 
and 'dislikes' a user registers in social media (Kosinski/Stillwell/Graepel 2013). This collection is 
then made available for commercial use to advertisers, to stores, to fundraising organisations, etc. 
Now one may wonder where the new value was generated. It is the following: if the data is sold 
to an agency that profiles citizens for their political preferences, then the 'likes' and 'dislikes' 
change their value for the user registering them, and become a public political statement of her 
beliefs. The innocuous 'likes' and 'dislikes' acquire great civil value for the user in certain social 
contexts, while the user is unaware of their value. More generally, our digital traces can be used in 
ways that retrospectively change their value and their standing from their original use. Since 
everything we do, nowadays, leaves our digital traces behind, everything we do may easily change 
its value for us, once a smart programmer authors a new algorithm for commercial or political 
use. 
III. Holding on to our Autonomy 
In his TED Talk on digital DNA, Genomics researcher Jun Wang talked of the 'Digital me' he 
has created of himself, in the context of a broader programme of developing digital 
doppelgangers of real people. With information about his own and other people's genetic code 
and health habits, he has developed digital profiles of each, and hopes to optimise personal and 
human health prospects by running tests of products and food on the profiles (Wang 2017). 
I wish to present a different conception of our 'Digital Selves', which is coming to us uninvited 
and probably unintended, and which I believe will not only revolutionise our social enterprise, 
but undermine the very fabric of personal and public personhood. 
The Digital Me or Digital Self that I am talking about is the result of the fast-developing intrusive 
digital technology. Already, computer technology can detect emotions on the basis of facial 
analysis of people: 'IBM's Watson AI can now understand our feelings' (Moldrich 2016). Soon, 
our mobile phone will be able to read our emotions, our reactions to situations, our feelings for 
those around us, our emotional profile, even our moral profile, our health condition, our sexual 
orientation and much, much more (Doerrfeld 2015). However, this is not what is alarming! What 
is alarming is that once such deep-learning algorithms are installed into our mobiles, they will be 
able to judge better than we can judge in all these domains (see e.g. Farnam Street 2017). Already, the 
algorithm that judges the sexual orientation of men is more accurate that human such judgements 
(Siddique 2015). 
Deep-learning in AI is becoming very successful in developing algorithms which discern, and 
make judgements on a host of different circumstances, doing so better than humans can; for 
example, facial recognition, determination of sexual orientation, whether one is feeling 
empathetic, one's current emotional disposition, and many more. However, this is deep-learning 
only in its infancy. Very soon, algorithms will prove to be better, often much better, than humans 
at making judgement in all walks of life. We will trust our mobiles to judge better than we could our 
feelings towards others, and theirs towards us; our chances of professional success; our children's 
understanding of their homework, and their chances of success in class and in sports; our trust in 
the claims of others (including the news); and most significantly, our feelings and beliefs about 
ourselves. We will in consequence voluntarily ask our mobiles to judge everything for us, because we 
will think they can do a better job judging than we can. Alarmingly, we are already entering the 
next generation in the design of algorithms, the post-deep-learning generation of algorithms, where 'brain 
principles will be used in Machine Intelligence' (NUMENTA 2017). 
IV. Mind the gap – the Agency Gap! 
The natural consequence of this is that others will not respond to us according to how our 
behaviour strikes them; or think about us on that basis; or judge us, and even feel for us feelings 
according to how we strike them. Rather, they will respond, think, judge, feel for us according to 
what their mobiles tell them we are. They will respond, think, judge, feel what they do about our 
Digital Selves as these are discerned by their mobiles. And we will do the same about them. 
The Digital Self is not something each of us possesses: it is a digital profile of us which others 
will have, and will interact with. It is as if we walked into a room, and all the others could see and 
respond to is our digital doppelganger in the monitors of their mobiles, watches, or smart glasses. 
The reason for this is that they will consider this digital doppelganger as more genuinely 'us', than 
their own conception of us, because this doppelganger will have been constructed on truer, more 
accurate judgements, made by their mobile algorithms. This is an Agency Gap, between the 
humans' conception of who we are (our Human Selves) and the algorithmic conception of who 
we are (that is, our Digital Selves in others' mobiles). 
It gets more complex, as there is a second gap. When we decide and/or we act, we will not do so 
according to what we judge, but according to what our mobiles advise us to do. The set of 
algorithms in our mobiles, advising us on our decisions and actions, will be our Second Digital 
Selves. If the mobiles of others judge us from our facial expressions, they will not “discern” what 
our mobiles decide for us to do. This will generate a Second Agency Gap, between three agents: how 
others perceive us (our Human Selves); how their algorithms discern us (our Digital Selves); and 
how our mobile-algorithms guide us to decide and act (our Second Digital Selves). 
However, there is an even worse fear. We will eventually relate to ourselves by conceiving of 
ourselves according to how our mobiles discern us. Our own self-conception will be mediated and 
shaped by what our mobile-algorithms tell us we are. We will end up trusting our mobiles more 
than we trust our introspection. A not uncommon response to the increasing intelligence of AI is 
Bostrom (2015), in his TED Talk, where he expresses the hope that if algorithms develop into 
super-intelligent beings, they will share our values and so we need not fear them. I would never 
bet my life on such odds. 
These changes are happening fast, and will thoroughly uproot the very way we conceive of 
ourselves, and how relate to everyone else, including our spouses, our children, our parents, and 
our best friends. 
V. Towards designing and redesigning our wellbeing 
How can we address this emerging problem of our autonomy, our autonomous agency and the 
sense of who we are? It is impossible to stop the progress of technology, for numerous psychological 
and sociological reasons. Nevertheless, leaving the direction and degree of social change to 
technological advancements in the private sector would be socially suicidal, because social 
flourishing is not a priority in a business company's list. If nothing else is done, we will rely on 
our mobiles to tell us who and what we are. We will thereby transfer our autonomy to our digital selves, 
namely, to the sets of algorithms to which we have relegated judging for us. It will feel as if we 
have consigned ourselves to our Wiser Big Brothers, because they are better at judging than we 
are – judging and deciding everything for us, about our environment and about ourselves. 
How can we flourish, in these circumstances? What does flourishing even mean, without 
autonomy and a sense of our own agency? Who is it that would be flourishing? We have 
encountered this conception of flourishing, early in the history of philosophy. Plato in his ideal 
state, in the Republic, tells us that the Philosopher Kings will come to understand the Good and 
what is good for society, and they will show the merchant class, who will not be able to 
comprehend the Good, how to live best and achieve their wellbeing.[1] In that context, the 
merchant class have deferred autonomy to the Philosopher Kings. Yet, since Aristotle, we have 
learned to endeavour to seek our wellbeing ourselves, based on what we learn in society and what 
we can judge ourselves (Scaltsas 1996). But now, it appears we will move from an Aristotelian 
conception of well-being, where we author our wellbeing and strive for our flourishing on our 
own devices, to a Platonic conception of well-being, where cognitively higher experts (in this case, 
algorithms) will tell us how to live and how to flourish. When IT companies exalt the services 
that IT devices will offer us in the era of IoT, and tell us how such devices will empower us, they 
fail to see and mention that they will also rob us of our autonomy and agency. Do we want this? 
Is this inevitable, as a result of the success of deep-learning devices? If we do not want to lose 
our autonomy, can we do something about it to avoid it? 
I believe we can, but we will need new values to help us redefine our flourishing, in view of the role 
that algorithms will play in our lives. So, how do we design new values? How do we design new 
conceptions of human flourishing and wellbeing, rather than have them dictated to us by deep-
learners. Presently, we do not even learn how to design our wellbeing, but shape it piecemeal, on 
the basis of directions we get at home, at school, from friends and colleagues, and our own 
judgement. This, though, will not suffice, because all of them will be replaced by better judges, 
algorithms! How do we stay ahead of algorithmic advancement, and take hold of change, and be 
able to confidently allot algorithmic advice in its slot within our world-scheme, rather than allow 
them to a lot us in the slot of 'users' of their advice. 
The need for such an education is urgent. We need to modify our understanding of personal and 
social wellbeing. We need to be able to design and redesign our conception of personal and social 
wellbeing, to keep up with, and even get ahead of technological intrusiveness, least we are 
flattened and replaced in its wake. Most of all, we need to learn how to creatively design new values, 
to design novel values of unprecedented types, for unprecedented social circumstances, for us 
and our machines. Yet, we need to start by learning how to design our wellbeing, before we can 
aim for redesigning it in creative ways. 
VI. Valuative Intelligence 
What I propose in this paper is that the general approach to the design of new, even creative social 
values (including all types of value governing and guiding our behaviours) is learning how to trade 
emotions for values and vice versa. This is a bold claim, which I will buttress with philosophical 
tradition and neurological discovery, and a challenging one, in view of the fact that nobody is 
being trained at school or university how to do so. 
The philosophical tradition, which in my understanding grounds and supports the inter-trading 
of emotions and values, starts with Plato (Cooper 1997), and culminates with Aristotle's Theory 
of Deliberation (Barnes 1984). It all starts with Socrates' Hedonic Calculus, in Plato's dialogue the 
Protagoras (Cooper 1997b, 35lb-358d) and the Phaedo (ibid. 1997a, 68c-69c). Socrates considers 
whether our good and wellbeing is a good calculation of which pleasures to pursue, but ultimately 
rejects it in favour of pursuing the good. Importantly for our purposes, Socrates here 
distinguishes pleasure from the good, the latter given to us by rationality, and hence distinguishes 
pleasurable activities from good activities for our flourishing. Thus, we cannot inter-trade 
pleasure and the good. 
Plato, too, does not think that we can inter-trade pleasures and the good, because they cannot 
communicate between them through rationality; appetitive desires are irrational, according to 
Plato.[2] However, I submit that Plato made a breakthrough that paved the way for Aristotle to 
introduce what I call inter-trading of pleasures and the good, or better, inter-trading bodily 
pleasures, emotions and values in our pursuit of wellbeing. The breakthrough is that there are 
'rational desires'. This comes in the exposition by Plato of the Tripartite Division of the Soul, 
which classifies the motivations we have for decision and action into three: the Rational 
motivations; the Emotive motivations; and the Appetitive motivations. What I consider Plato's 
breakthrough is that all three types are presented as desires, which shows them to have a common 
genus, at some level of classification: rational desires; emotive desires; and appetitive desires. The 
philosophical tradition and commentating on Plato's work has considered the irrationality of the 
appetites as determining the breakdown of communication between the three parts of the soul. I 
am saying, by contrast, that their common desiderative genus can become the ground for the 
development of an exchange between them, which is what I have argued Aristotle has done in his 
theory of ethical deliberation. 
The Rational part of our soul, speaking Platonese, may be motivated to seek healthy pursuits; the 
Emotive part may be motivated to aim for honour or an emotion; and the Appetitive part may be 
motivated to pursue bodily activities and desires. As soon as one recognises that there are desires 
that are generated by rationality, namely, rational desires, as Plato recognised through the Rational 
part of the soul, pone is introducing a desiderative-lingua-franca between the parts of the soul, even if 
reason cannot function as lingua-franca between them. Reason can prevail by the strength of the rational desires as 
desires, rather than by convincing appetites through reasoning – which it cannot do, since appetites are not 
sensitive to reason. The exegetical tradition has understood the Platonic trichotomy as 
documenting the breakdown of communication. I am suggesting that, on the contrary, it opens 
the way for the communication between all the parts of the soul: goodness can be achieved by 
the balanced satisfaction of the desires of the three parts of the soul. 
The difference between the (early-Plato) Socratic Hedonic Calculus and the (middle-Plato) 
Tripartite Division of the Soul is that, once rational desires are introduced, which are desires 
stemming from what we now call values, e.g. for health, wellbeing can be pursued by balancing 
these desires – by running the Hedonic Calculus across rational, emotive, appetitive desires. Plato 
did not see this, because he thought there is an insurmountable obstacle between rational and 
appetitive desires.[3] I am claiming Aristotle saw this possibility, and explained it, introducing 
even pleasures of virtuous activities from the satisfaction of rational desires, and implemented it. 
This is why I see Aristotle as finally paying justice to what Socrates was trying to do with his 
Hedonic Calculus in Plato's Protagoras. 
Aristotle has a different conception of the human soul than Plato, believing that the soul is 
divided into a Rational and an Irrational part, but where the Irrational part is sensitive to the 
Rational one.[4] What does sensitivity mean or entail? It means that the agent has methods by 
which to train and to shape their irrational desires to accord with the rational ones. For example, if 
one believes that excessively fatty food is unhealthy for them to consume, they may train 
themselves not to desire such food. As that agent trains her appetites to dislike excessively fatty 
food, she is enabling her appetites to 'listen' to reason by becoming shaped (through training) by 
considerations of reason. There are many qualifications to this method, having to do with the age 
of the agent, the type of the desire, the method of training them, etc., but we will not get into this 
discussion here. Rather, we leave it as a subsequent question to pursue, for the educational 
programme that would follow from this proposal of inter-trading appetites, emotions and values 
in the pursuit of our wellbeing. 
Aristotle holds that our wellbeing can be achieved as the harmonious activity of rational 
biological organisms. It is what we may call a 'Holistic Hedonic Calculus', where the holism will be 
explained below as the agent's ability to reshape the desiderative parts to fit the eudaimonic 
whole through joint satisfaction. The argument for this position is complex, and involves the 
Doctrine of the Mean, as Aristotle understood it, and his Function Argument for human beings, 
which I will not discuss here (Scaltsas 1996). What I will point out here is that his argument is not 
intellectualist. I submit that Aristotle does not set rationality as the ultimate common 
denominator, the way Plato did. For Aristotle, I contend, rationality is constituted by the Holistic 
Hedonic Calculus of the harmonious pleasurable activity of the totality of one's desires. 
Aristotle seeks to harmonise the desires of the soul (Scaltsas 1996, 299-302). Harmonising them 
will be guided by the experience we have inherited from our elders, and from our own experience, 
understood as a whole through rationality. Rationality is not presupposed as a primitive it is built 
up, bottom-up.[5] Reason and the rational desires are put to the test, and are shaped and 
reshaped along with the rest of our desires, to finally deliver the best balance for the achievement 
of harmony in the satisfaction of the desires of the whole soul. It is what we might call a rich 
conception of rationality, grounding the achievement of wellbeing. What I have been referring to 
as the inter-trading of appetites, emotions and values is exactly this shaping and reshaping of desires of 
all kinds, of the rational organism, to achieve harmony between them. Rational desires ground 
values and motivate us towards values; emotive desires ground moods and attitudes, and 
motivate us towards items we feel for; and appetitive desires ground sensations and passions of 
various types, and motivate us towards 'objects of desire'. Harmony between them is not a matter 
of balancing them against each other; it is a matter of shaping them and reshaping them to 
achieve a type of unity in the activities of the rational biological organism, which the ancients 
called eudaimonia and we call flourishing and wellbeing. Wellbeing is not a sensation of pleasure, 
or an emotion of happiness, or an experience of satisfaction. Wellbeing is activity, it is a way of 
living life that achieves harmonious satisfaction of our rational, emotive and appetitive desires. 
Is Aristotle, or the reading of Aristotle I propose, credible and sound? Can, indeed, emotions and 
appetites be traded for and reshaped with rational values, and vice versa? Can this trading require or 
result in new types of value and feeling which we will design? My claim is that we can take this step 
confidently, going a step beyond what Aristotle described, by allowing for the creative design of 
values, emotions and appetites I base my claim on the Aristotelian background theory of 
wellbeing, and on neuroscientist's Antonio Damasio's findings that the origins of our mental life, 
which governs our behaviour, including appetites, emotions and values, are physical feelings (his 
somatic marker hypothesis, e.g. itching, hunger, longing, etc.) (Damasio 2008, 1991). Physical -
feelings have grounded the desires (Lenzen 2013) that turn out to be our evolutionary currency 
for appetitive, emotional and valuative reactions to the world. 
VII. Neuroscience in support of the Holistic Hedonic 
Calculus 
According to Damasio (2001), physical feelings were the proto-conceptual; proto-emotional; and 
proto-valuative experiences of the 'mind'. Physical feelings grounded emotional reactions (widely 
speaking) towards the environment, which have been the fundamental currency of the mental in 
its evolutionary history. These emotional reactions can be organised, classified, streamlined, to 
ground mental conceptions, dispositions, and principles that govern our lives (Stenning 2002, 
263-266). Backtracking on our evolution, we can 'liquefy' the mental conceptions, dispositions, 
and principles we have developed into the currency of positive and negative emotional reactions, 
or desires at large (which were originally grounded on physical feelings), in order to redesign 
these desires and reconfigure them into new forms of conceptions, dispositions, and principles 
that will facilitate our flourishing and wellbeing. Experiments of Antonio Damasio, which have 
shown that emotions (i.e. desires at large) are much more primitive, as a ground of reasoning and 
of decisions to behave, than concepts (Damasio 2010, 2003, 1999). Emotions (broadly 
understood) have guided action, pre-conceptually, as early in the evolutionary chain as before 
simple organisms were formed – when there were only gene formations of life. Concepts came 
much later, not to replace the behavioural compass of emotions, but as an additional layer of 
organisation of mental life, to guide behaviour, in working out the utility and functionality of 
emotional evaluations of the environment for the organism. Stenning (2002) built, theoretically, 
on the experimental results of Damasio, utilising Wittgenstein's semantic theory of definition, and 
explained how emotions operate as the ground of abstracting and of classifying, on the basis of 
similarities of impact of the environment on the organism. More generally, the way the world 
impacts emotionally on us grounds the way we comprehend our world. We classify things, 
activities, and relations in our environment on the basis of the feelings generated in us from 
infancy in our interaction with our environment (Stenning 2002). It is emotions that underlie 
analogy, comparison, and similarity. The concepts we use to classify and order our 
representations of what there is around us have non-linear, affective foundations; these affective 
foundations predate, evolutionarily, the creation of language, and have guided our behaviour 
towards others, and towards cooperative or adversarial situations in our environment. 
VIII. Teaching the creative design of wellbeing 
We live in an era of constant radical change: of environmental, social, and digital transformations. 
Our possibilities for flourishing and for wellbeing alter drastically every decade, and soon, every 
year, rather than every era. We face the need of designing and redesigning our wellbeing ourselves, 
if we are to attain flourishing within our lifetime, let alone to flourish in every phase of our lives. 
How do we do this, in the midst of digital social flux? What we learned as children about 
flourishing and wellbeing from home and school does not suffice for guiding us through the new 
digital infringements and predicaments. How do we design, and redesign anew our wellbeing? 
The educational challenge goes deeper. At school we are taught how to solve conceptual problems. 
Wellbeing is not a conceptual puzzle; it is a problem that involves conceptual, emotional, 
appetitive and valuative incongruities, together, which we need to smooth out, so as to attain 
goodness in our lives. Smoothing out incongruities can be achieved only by redesigning our 
desires through training. So here is the new challenge: How does one solve the problem of 
redesigning concepts, emotions, appetites, and values, in order to handle the radical flux of 
algorithmic digital intrusions into our lives? We conducted an experiment to find out. 
In Project C2Learn (2012-2015) about teaching 'emotive lateral thinking' in schools, during the 
pilot phase of the project, our educators asked the participating students 'Socratic Questions', to 
understand their process of thinking, which motivated them to propose creative solutions to the 
problems we had posed to them (Stenning et.al. 2016). What soon became clear to us was that, 
intuitively, the students were putting into practice Aristotle's intuitions about deliberation, 
vindicating Damasio's (2010, 2003, 1999) conjectures about the origins of our mental life and the 
primacy of emotions and feelings in our mental evolution. What the students were doing was to 
search and find ways to 'trade off' values for emotions, in their effort to plot ways out of the 
predicaments we had presented them with in our stories. 
We presented intractable social problems to school students in three different European 
countries, and suggested methods to them of how to go about devising conceptions of wellbeing 
for exactly such incongruous circumstances. Our goal was to see if they could cope with the 
challenges, and if yes, what the mechanism was for achieving the goal of innovating new shapes 
and colours of human wellbeing. 
They surprised us. We gave them stories, with dissonant social situations they had not 
encountered before, and they innovated in their design of possibilities for flourishing in them. 
They did it effortlessly, uninhibitedly, but sensibly. So, what did we learn from them? We learned 
that they can understand how appetites, emotions and values can be designed and redesigned, by 
'liquefying' them, recalibrating them, recombining and remixing them with appropriate training. 
The 'key' for this procedure was: trading, negotiating, mixing, carving up, and redistributing 
appetites, emotions and values, which initially had seemed resistant to bartering and reshaping. 
This is what we need to introduce in educational training in schools, in order for students to learn 
to design values and emotional responses to challenging predicaments, rather than learn to 
'conform' to these demanding circumstances and accept their inevitability. When systematised, 
this training will involve Emotional Intelligence and Valuative Intelligence, explaining the 
methodological differences between them. This would empower students, and any adults so 
trained, offering them understanding and showing them how to take the 'pilot seat' in the 
algorithmic challenges we will face in the era of the smart IoT, by designing themselves and their 
own future wellbeing. 
Explaining what Valuative Intelligence is to school students is demanding and requires a panoply of 
examples, suitable for different ages, about how we can generate new values, as opposed to simply 
inheriting them through social media interactions and social traditions. We need to explain to 
students what 'value hacking' is, by the deep-learning algorithms of intrusive digital technologies 
in the smart IoT era, and show them how they can, in response, design and shape their own values 
– whether moral, social, cultural, gender, ethnic, racial, etc. values. 
It is essential to begin teaching this skill to all: students and adults alike. The method has been 
given to us by Aristotle: Deliberation, which is the ability to weigh up and rationally trade (by 
training) emotions, feelings, and values, in order to attain a coherent and harmonious operation 
of the total activity of a human organism.[6] However, going beyond Aristotle[7] we need to learn 
to design new types of value, and new types of feeling to situations, in order to respond to 
unprecedented social circumstances that await us in the coming days. Emotional Intelligence will 
help us identify our emotions, feelings and attachments towards situations and people, including 
ourselves (Goleman 1995). Valuative Intelligence will help us identify our commitments to 
principles that govern our behaviour, and the reasons for them. We need to learn how to let our 
Emotional Intelligence communicate with our Valuative Intelligence, in order to keep building 
conceptions of wellbeing that will incorporate the changes in society rather than surrender to 
them. 
IX. Conclusion 
Our intuitions are not sufficient to guide us through the search for our wellbeing. The demands of 
continuous social flux are too challenging and urgent to face them untrained in Valuative 
Intelligence. Traditionally, parents and schools teach society's code of ethical behaviour to young 
people, and the professions to adults – the do's and don'ts. Nevertheless, bygone are the days of 
aspiring and acquiescing to 'leaving things as we found them'; things as we found them cannot 
cope with the changes happening from every direction, nowadays. Today's changes of the 
environment, of society, and of smart IoT technology are fundamental and uprooting. Students 
and young adults will not be able to use the emotional and valuative solutions for wellbeing that 
worked for their parents, which they learned from their parents. In addition to the wellbeing 
codes of their parents, young people need to learn how to design their own codes of wellbeing, lest 
algorithms do so for them. They are not taught this skill anywhere, at present; but training them 
so would equip them to configure, themselves, ways of flourishing, despite the incongruities they 
will face in their social environments. Students need to learn if and how goals, feelings, and 
principles can or cannot be reconfigured, in order to attain the elusive wellbeing in today's society. 
If we do not empower them so, the changes of smart IoT will roller-coaster over their lives. 
 
[1] Plato, 'Unless . . . philosophers become kings in the cities or those whom we now call kings 
and rulers philosophize truly and adequately and there is a conjunction of political power and 
philosophy . . . there can be no cessation of evils . . . for cities nor, I think, for the human race.' 
(Rep. V.473c11–d6) 
[2] Republic 439c-d: 'there is something in the soul ... with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and 
feels the flutter and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion of various 
repletions and pleasures”. 
[3] According to Plato, appetitive desires are a-rational, namely, they are not sensitive to rational 
considerations. Plato's example is that when one is thirsty, one wants a drink, rather than a 
healthy drink; thirst does not recognise healthiness as an advantage of some drinks over others, 
making them 'good' or 'better' drinks. In consequence, the Rational part of the soul needs to 
impose itself on the other parts, especially on the Appetitive desires, in order to satisfy only the 
desires that would not undermine the pursuit of the Rational ones. In other words, wellbeing is 
achieved, according to Plato, only by the use of self-control in the pursuit of the soul's desires, 
frustrating some in order to pursue others. Plato, Republic IV 436e–441c. 
[4] 'The appetitive and in general the desiring element [in the soul] in a sense shares in it [in the 
rational principle of the soul], in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we 
speak of paying heed to one's father or one's friend.' (Nicomachean Ethics, 1102b 30–32). 
[5] I believe that this includes the Principle of Non-Contradiction, which Aristotle discusses us in 
Metaphysics Γ (Gamma) 3–6; but I will not argue for it here. Aristotle says is that even if one 
denies the Principle of Non-Contradiction verbally, her behaviour will betray her: 'For why does 
a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be walking there? Why 
does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his 
way? Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that 
falling in is alike good and not good? Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and 
another worse.' (Metaphysics, 1008b 14–19). 
[6] Aristotle says: 'it is held to be the mark of a prudent [phronimos = practically wise] man to be 
able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one 
department, for instance what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous to the 
good life in general [eu zên ólôs = wellbeing].' (Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a 25–28). 
[7] This is deliberately provocative. Aristotle standardly said that we deliberate about the means 
for an action e.g. Nicompachean Ethics 1112b15-20; but he also said, enigmatically, that 'Virtue 
makes the target [the end] right; practical wisdom makes the things towards it [right; i.e. the 
means]' (EN 1144a7-9). However, since virtue is developed by training in the values of society, 
the possibility emeges of diverging from tradition, when society designes new values through 
such training. 
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